Divine foreknowledge and newcomb's paradox

Philosophia 17 (3):331-350 (1987)
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Abstract

Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context of foreknowledge, backtracking counterfactuals are entirely appropriate and that no alteration of the past occurs. With the justification of the one box strategy, the death of theological fatalism seems ensured. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A0985044 00003

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William Lane Craig
Houston Baptist University

Citations of this work

Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem.Arif Ahmed - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):261-273.
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies.Stephanie Rennick - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (3):78.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals and newcomb’s problem.Terence Horgan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):331-356.
Newcomb’s Paradox Revisited.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):295-304.
A note on newcombmania.Isaac Levi - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):337-342.

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