Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy Of Science 71 (5):960-971 (2004)
|Abstract||It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion|
|Keywords||Illusion Kind Memory Neuroscience Science Self Splitting Ramachandran, V|
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