How natural can ontology be?

Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132 (2000)
Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of "natural" in NOA is "nonphilosophical," but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical attitude there are still legitimate philosophical questions to address.
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DOI 10.1086/392764
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Peter Mulder (2010). On the Alleged Non-Existence of Orbitals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (2):178-182.

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