Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469 (2009)
|Abstract||It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
Danilo Dantas (2009). What (and How) Was I Thinking?: On Memory of Past Thoughts. Intuitio 2 (2):103-107.
Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
Susanna Siegel (2006). Which Properties Are Represented in Perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Perception, Generality, and Reasons. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford University
J. Dokic (1998). The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads341 ( #417 of 722,951 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #9,247 of 722,951 )
How can I increase my downloads?