David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469 (2009)
It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.
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Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Craig French (2013). Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P. Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
Jonathan David Trigg (2011). Representation, Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):5-30.
Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.
Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate (2011). Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
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