Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis

Oxford University Press (1990)
Abstract
In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, this compelling work will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology and the philosophy of language.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Language and languages Philosophy
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Call number BD161.C67 1990
ISBN(s) 0198238797   9780198238799  
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    John Hyman (1999). How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):433-451.

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