Mental causation and mental reality

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (425):185-202 (1992)
Abstract
Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be
Keywords Causation  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Reality
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Citations of this work BETA
Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Tim Crane, Lawrence Vogel, Gerardine Meaney & Michael Hampe (1993). Critical Notices. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):313 – 353.
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