``On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism"

Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240 (1998)
In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil199815220
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William Lane Craig (1994). Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):857-861.
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