``On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism"
Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240 (1998)
| Abstract | In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom | |||||||||
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William Lane Craig (1998). On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism. Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240.
William Hasker (2000). ``Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):126-131.
William Hasker (1999). A New Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):291-297.
William Hasker (1997). Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, a Reply to William Craig. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):389-393.
Thomas P. Flint (1999). A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument. Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
Dean Zimmerman (2009). Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press.
Michael Rota (2012). Freedom and the Necessity of the Present. Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):451-465.
William Hasker (2000). Are Alternative Pasts Plausible? A Reply to Thomas Flint. Religious Studies 36 (1):103-105.
Andrew Gleeson (2010). More on the Power of God: A Rejoinder to William Hasker. Sophia 49 (4):617-629.
Luke Gelinas (2009). The Problem of Natural Evil II: Hybrid Replies. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):560-574.
William Lane Craig (1994). Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):857-861.
Michael Rota (2010). A Problem for Hasker. Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):287-305.
Bruce Reichenbach (1987). Hasker on Omniscience. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):86-92.
Jonathan Kvanvig (2002). On Behalf of Maverick Molinism. Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.
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