``On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism"

Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240 (1998)
Abstract In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom
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    Dean Zimmerman (2009). Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press.
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