Abstract

Alvin Plantinga has proposed a distinctive answer to the question whether belief in the existence of God apart from evidence is rational. Developing the suggestions of various theologians in the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition into a philosophically rigorous epistemological theory, Plantinga espouses what he calls Reformed epistemology. Reformed epistemology defends the rationality of belief in God's existence by arguing that belief in God is a properly basic belief. It argues, therefore, that belief in God is eminently rational apart from any evidence; for a basic belief is foundational and not based on evidence. I do two things in this study: I attempt to clarify key aspects of Reformed epistemological theory, discussing at greater depth certain of its more problematic aspects and expanding the theory where necessary to show its basic coherence and/or plausibility; and I attempt to answer the question whether Reformed epistemology is right--whether it accurately captures the epistemological status of the theist's belief in God. My answer is that most likely it does not. I argue that--due to an overly vague conception of "basic belief"--Plantinga has failed to recognize a fundamental incompatibility in his own views on the status of theistic belief. Furthermore, I argue that, when we have rightly understood what Reformed epistemology requires with respect to the nature of theistic belief, it is doubtful that Plantinga or any other theist actually holds his belief in God on the epistemological basis that Reformed epistemology says he does