Review of Sandra D. Mitchell: Unsimple truths: science, complexity, and policy [Book Review]

Biology and Philosophy 26 (2):305-313 (2011)
Abstract
In Unsimple truths, Sandra D. Mitchell examines the historical context of current scientific practices and elaborates the challenges complexity has since posed to status quo science and policymaking. Mitchell criticizes models of science inspired by Newtonian physics and argues for a pragmatistic, anti-universalist approach to science. In this review, I focus on what I find to be the most important point of the book, Mitchell’s argument for the conceptual independence of compositional materialism and descriptive fundamentalism. Along the way, I provide a description of Mitchell’s overall project and a road map of the book
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
Sandra D. Mitchell (2009). Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy. The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London.
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Similar books and articles
Sandra D. Mitchell (2009). Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy. The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London.
Sandra D. Mitchell (2003). Preface. Philosophy of Science 70 (5).
Sandra D. Mitchell (1989). The Causal Background of Functional Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (2):213 – 229.
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