The extent of the present

One of the principal objections to a tensed or dynamic theory of time is the ancient puzzle about the extent of the present. Three alternative conceptions of the extent of the present are considered: an instantaneous present, an atomic present, and a non-metrical present. The first conception is difficult to reconcile with the objectivity of temporal becoming posited by a dynamic theory of time. The second conception solves that problem, but only at the expense of making change discontinuous. The third conception is the most plausible: that "the present" is a non-metrical notion which must be completed by the mention of some event or interval in order to have a measure, in which case what is present varies with one's context.
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DOI 10.1080/02698590050045746
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References found in this work BETA
D. H. Mellor (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.
Donald C. Williams (1951). The Myth of Passage. Journal of Philosophy 48 (15):457-472.

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Citations of this work BETA
L. Nathan Oaklander (2002). Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-.

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