David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):372-373 (1999)
We question the usefulness of Pylyshyn's dichotomy between cognitively penetrable and cognitively impenetrable mechanisms as the basis for his distinction between cognition and early vision. This dichotomy is comparable to others that have been proposed in psychology prompting disputes that by their very nature could not be resolved. This fate is inevitable for Pylyshyn's thesis because of its reliance on internal representations and their interpretation. What is more fruitful in relation to this issue is not a difficult dichotomy, but a different look at perception such as proposed by Gibson (1979).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alexander Grunewald (1999). Neurophysiology Indicates Cognitive Penetration of the Visual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.
Birgitta Dresp (1999). The Cognitive Impenetrability Hypothesis: Doomsday for the Unity of the Cognitive Neurosciences? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):375-376.
José Luis Bermúdez (1999). Cognitive Impenetrability, Phenomenology, and Nonconceptual Content. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):367-368.
Edouard Gentaz & Yves Rossetti (1999). Is Haptic Perception Continuous with Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):378-379.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
Philippe G. Schyns (1999). The Case for Cognitive Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.
Patrick Cavanagh (1999). The Cognitive Impenetrability of Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):370-371.
Lester E. Krueger (1999). An Even Stronger Case for the Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):382-383.
Yiannis Aloimonos, FermÜ & Cornelia Ller (1999). Visual Space is Not Cognitively Impenetrable. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):366-367.
Cathleen M. Moore (1999). Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision Does Not Imply Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):385-386.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #261,434 of 1,688,130 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #183,788 of 1,688,130 )
How can I increase my downloads?