On Kaplan on Carnap on significance

Philosophical Studies 30 (6):393 - 400 (1976)
In 'the methodological character of theoretical concepts' carnap offered a sophisticated criterion of empirical significance. Unfortunately, Shortly thereafter david kaplan devised a pair of devastating counter-Examples which appeared to show that carnap's criterion was simultaneously too wide and too narrow. In this note I show that kaplan's first counter-Example misses its mark and that his second counter-Example can be avoided by a natural generalization of carnap's method
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372539
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Thomas Uebel (2011). Beyond the Formalist Criterion of Cognitive Significance: Philipp Frank’s Later Antimetaphysics. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (1):47-72.
Thomas Uebel (2011). Carnap's Ramseyfications Defended. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):71-87.

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