Taking theories seriously

Synthese 62 (3):317 - 345 (1985)
Abstract
This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars'' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen''s work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a wide family of anti-realist views (of which van Fraassen''s is only one) is problematic and unmotivated and hence to be rejected.
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Rudolph Carnap (1963). Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,Open Court. 958--966.

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Citations of this work BETA
Adam Grobler (1991). Van Fraassen's Metaphysical Move. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):21 – 34.
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