Hedonism reconsidered

This paper is a plea for hedonism to be taken more seriously. It begins by charting hedonism's decline, and suggests that this is a result of two major objections: the claim that hedonism is the 'philosophy of swine', reducing all value to a single common denominator, and Nozick's 'experience machine' objection. There follows some elucidation of the nature of hedonism, and of enjoyment in particular. Two types of theory of enjoyment are outlined-intemalism, according to which enjoyment has some special 'feeling tone'. and externalism, according to which enjoyment is any kind of experience to which we take some special attitude, such as that of desire. lnternalism-the traditional view--is defended against current externalist orthodoxy. The paper ends with responses to the philosophy of swine and the experience machine objections
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x
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Ben Bramble (2015). On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.
Christopher Belshaw (2014). What's Wrong with the Experience Machine? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):573-592.
Roger Crisp (2008). Compassion and Beyond. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):233 - 246.

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