The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-185 (2000)
| Abstract | Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well known Consequence argument. Critics of the Consequence argument have presented counterexamples to the Consequence argument's central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the Consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of these counterexamples | |||||||||
| Keywords | Consequence Counterexample Free Will Indeterminism Metaphysics Van Inwagen, P | |||||||||
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