Thing talk moonlighting
Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):83 - 98 (2002)
| Abstract | It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a locutionary level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude talk which is labeled the moonlighting use of thing-talk. | |||||||||
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