'Wholly present' defined

Three-dimensionalists , sometimes referred to as endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being “wholly present” at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The threedimensionalist is free, of course, to take ‘is wholly present at’ as one of her theory’s primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be better off if she could state her theory in terms accessible to all. We think she can. What is needed is a definition of ‘is wholly present at’ that all can understand. in this paper, we offer one.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00451.x
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Cody Gilmore (2006). Where in the Relativistic World Are We? Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
Matthew McGrath (2007). Temporal Parts. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.
Paul Hovda (2013). Tensed Mereology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):241-283.

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