9. “All Probabilistic Methods Assume a Subjective Definition of Probability”

Abstract
In previous publications on probability, I have followed I.J. Good in arguing that probability must be defined subjectively if we accept that the world is causally deterministic. In this article I go significantly beyond this position, arguing that we are forced to accept a subjective definition of probability if we [...]
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