David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):307 – 323 (1992)
I compare the failure of counterfactual dependence as a criterion of event causation to the failure of stochastic dependence as a criterion of causal law. Counterexamples to the stochastic analysis arise from cases of Simpson's Paradox, and Nancy Cartwright has suggested a way of transforming the stochastic analysis into something that avoids these counterexample. There is an analogical relationship between cases of Simpson's Paradox and cases of causal overdetermination. I exploit this analogical relationship to motivate my own view about the connection between counterfactuals and event causation. According to my view, counterfactuals and event causation are intimately connected by a principle which falls short of being an analysis but which, as I show, correctly handles not only overdetermination but common causes as well.
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