Conditional logic and the significance of Tooley's example
Analysis 66 (292):325–335 (2006)
| Abstract | In "Backward causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis approach to counterfactuals," Analysis 62 (2002): 191–97, Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis style comparative world similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. Tooley’s target is one particular type of semantics, but, as I show, the significance of Tooley’s example goes well beyond its consequences for any one semantics for the conditional. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesCharles B. Cross (2008). Antecedent-Relative Comparative World Similarity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (2):101-120.
Ernest Sosa & Michael Tooley (eds.) (1993). Causation. Oxford University Press.
Michael Tooley (2000). Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
Michael Tooley (1987). Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford University Press.
Michael Tooley (2003). The Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):371 - 377.
Michael Tooley (2003). The Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):371 - 377.
Michael Tooley (2002). Backward Causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals. Analysis 62 (3):191–197.
Charles B. Cross (2009). Conditional Excluded Middle. Erkenntnis 70 (2):173-188.
Paul Noordhof (2003). Tooley on Backward Causation. Analysis 63 (2):157–162.
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