Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):101 – 106 (2002)
|Abstract||In "Against the Indicative," AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1994): 17-26, and more recently in "Classifying `Conditionals': the Traditional Way is Wrong", ANALYSIS 60 (2000): 147, V.H. Dudman argues that (a) `If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy then someone else did' and (b) `If Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy then someone else will' should not be classified together as "indicative conditionals." Dudman relies on the assumption that (a) is entailed by (c) `Someone shot Kennedy', whereas (b) is not entailed by (d) `Someone will shoot Kennedy'. I argue that the same reasoning which shows that (d) does not entail (b) also shows that (c) does not entail (a). One upshot is that Dudman's and Mellor's respective interpretations of so-called past indicative conditionals cannot be correct.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
Daniel Nolan (2003). Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 116 (3):215-269.
Daniel Rothschild (2013). Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions? Noûs 47 (1):49-68.
J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Conversation and Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.
V. H. Dudman (2000). Classifying ‘Conditionals’: The Traditional Way is Wrong. Analysis 60 (266):147–147.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Justin Khoo (2011). Operators or Restrictors? A Reply to Gillies. Semantics and Pragmatics 4:1-25.
Keith DeRose & Richard E. Grandy (1999). Conditional Assertions and "Biscuit" Conditionals. Noûs 33 (3):405-420.
Added to index2010-05-07
Total downloads8 ( #123,218 of 549,130 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,130 )
How can I increase my downloads?