David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242 (2010)
Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at things
|Keywords||attention Agency experience activities|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sebastian Watzl (2011). The Philosophical Significance of Attention. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
Louise Richardson (2015). IX—Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):147-165.
Clare Mac Cumhaill (2015). Perceiving Immaterial Paths. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):687-715.
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