The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242 (2010)
Abstract
Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at things.
Keywords attention   Agency   experience   activities
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00285.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Clare Mac Cumhaill (2015). Perceiving Immaterial Paths. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):687-715.

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