Two conceptions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism

Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276 (2006)
Abstract
Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject.
Keywords PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE   'MIND-AND-WORLD'
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Geach (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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