Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism

Political Theory 35 (2):121 - 146 (2007)
Is the liberal state entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of its nonliberal minorities to promote individual autonomy as a public ideal, or should it tolerate the nonliberal practices of such groups in the name of legitimate diversity? This problem can be fruitfully approached from the perspective of Isaiah Berlin's notion of "value pluralism." According to William Galston, value pluralism privileges a form of liberalism that is maximally accommodating of nonliberal groups and their practices. I agree that pluralism fits best with a liberal political framework, but I depart from Galston's interpretation of what liberal pluralism involves. Taking value pluralism seriously, I argue, implies a form of liberalism in which personal autonomy is a central public ideal.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    John Gray (1998). Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1):17 – 36.
    Robert B. Talisse (2011). Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):87-100.

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    11 ( #112,987 of 1,088,784 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #42,743 of 1,088,784 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.