The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected
Mind 121 (482):457-466 (2012)
| Abstract | This essay corrects an error in the presentation of the Paradox of the Knowledge-Plus Knower, which is the variant of Kaplan and Montague’s Knower Paradox presented in C. Cross 2001: ‘The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure,’ MIND, 110, pp. 319–33. The correction adds a universally quantified transitivity principle for derivability as an additional assumption leading to paradox. This correction does not affect the status of the Knowledge-Plus paradox as a rebuttal to an argument against epistemic closure, since the quantified transitivity principle is true in the standard model of arithmetic and therefore innocuous. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Knower Paradox Epistemic Closure | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesCharles B. Cross (2004). More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 113 (449):109-114.
Charles B. Cross (2001). The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 110 (438):319-333.
Stephen Maitzen (1998). The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure. Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
Gabriel Uzquiano (2004). The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure? Mind 113 (449):95-107.
Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
Zbigniew Tworak (2011). Paradoks znawcy (The Knower Paradox). Filozofia Nauki 3.
Patrick Grim (1993). Operators in the Paradox of the Knower. Synthese 94 (3):409 - 428.
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2000). The Principle of Uniform Solution (of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference). Mind 109 (433):117-122.
Paul Égré (2005). The Knower Paradox in the Light of Provability Interpretations of Modal Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1).
JC Beall (2000). Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
M. Yan (2013). When Does Epistemic Closure Fail? Analysis 73 (2):260-264.
Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence.
Patrick Grim (1991). The Incomplete Universe. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-11-16Total downloads10 ( #106,239 of 549,064 )Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #12,324 of 549,064 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
