The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected

Mind 121 (482):457-466 (2012)
Abstract
This essay corrects an error in the presentation of the Paradox of the Knowledge-Plus Knower, which is the variant of Kaplan and Montague’s Knower Paradox presented in C. Cross 2001: ‘The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure,’ MIND, 110, pp. 319–33. The correction adds a universally quantified transitivity principle for derivability as an additional assumption leading to paradox. This correction does not affect the status of the Knowledge-Plus paradox as a rebuttal to an argument against epistemic closure, since the quantified transitivity principle is true in the standard model of arithmetic and therefore innocuous.
Keywords Knower Paradox  Epistemic Closure
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Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
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Michael J. Shaffer (2013). Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.
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