What is a disposition?

Synthese 144 (3):321-41 (2005)
Abstract
Attempts to capture the distinction between categorical and dispositional states in terms of more primitive modal notions – subjunctive conditionals, causal roles, or combinatorial principles – are bound to fail. Such failure is ensured by a deep symmetry in the ways dispositional and categorical states alike carry modal import. But the categorical/dispositional distinction should not be abandoned; it underpins important metaphysical disputes. Rather, it should be taken as a primitive, after which the doomed attempts at reductive explanation can be transformed into circular but interesting accounts.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118567
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Mumford (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Simon Kittle (2015). Abilities to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
Benedikt Paul Göcke (2015). Did God Do It? Metaphysical Models and Theological Hermeneutics. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (2):215-231.
David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.

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