Utilitas 18 (2):154-172 (2006)
|Abstract||In this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and Raz, most of a person's property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g. consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be morally fundamental ‘human rights’.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
W. J. Talbott (2010). Human Rights and Human Well-Being. Oxford University Press.
Peter Vallentyne (2001). Self-Ownership. In Laurence Becker & Charlotte Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition. Garland Publishing.
Hugh Breakey (2009). Liberalism and Intellectual Property Rights. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (3):329-349.
Larry May (1986). Corporate Property Rights. Journal of Business Ethics 5 (3):225 - 232.
J. M. Elegido (1995). Intrinsic Limitations of Property Rights. Journal of Business Ethics 14 (5):411 - 416.
Peter Lewin (2007). Creativity or Coercion: Alternative Perspectives on Rights to Intellectual Property. Journal of Business Ethics 71 (4):441 - 455.
Robert E. Goodin (1990). Property Rights and Preservationist Duties. Inquiry 33 (4):401 – 432.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads63 ( #14,692 of 549,045 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #12,324 of 549,045 )
How can I increase my downloads?