Representing high-level properties in perceptual experience

Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294 (2011)
Abstract
High-level theory is the view that high-level properties?the property of being a dog, being a tiger, being an apple, being a pair of lips, etc.?can be represented in perceptual experience. Low-level theory denies this and claims that high-level properties are only represented at the level of perceptual judgment and are products of cognitive interpretation of low-level sensory information (color, shape, illumination). This paper discusses previous attempts to establish high-level theory, their weaknesses, and an argument for high-level theory that does not have these weaknesses
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.

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