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- Jack S. Crumley (1989). Talking Lions and Lion Talk: Davidson on Conceptual Schemes. Synthese 80 (3).This essay is a reconstruction and defense of Davidson''s argument against the intelligiblity of the notion of conceptual scheme. After presenting a brief clarification of Davidson''s argument in On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, I turn to reconstructing Davidson''s argument. Unlike many commentators, and occasionally Davidson, who hold that the motive force of the argument is the Principle of Charity (or the denial of the Third Dogma), I argue that there is a further principle which underlies the argument. This principle I call the Strong Discrimination Principle.But the argument of the paper is not purely exegetical. Not only do I show how the Strong Discrimination Principle meets certain objections to Davidson''s argument, but I show how the Principle clarifies the realist position. In particular, I show how a line of argument advanced by Rorty and Putnam against (metaphysical) realism can be rejected.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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In his paper "Supervenience Revisisted", Simon Blackburn redeployed his novel modal argument against moral realism as an argument against Donald Davidson's position of 'anomalous monism' in the philosophy of mind (Blackburn 1985).' I shall assess this redeployment. In the first part of this paper, I shall lay out Blackburn's argument. In the second and longer part I shall examine Davidson's denial of psychophysical laws in the light of this argument.
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| | Other links: springerlink.com dur.ac.uk jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Nulty proposes a Davidsonian argument for metaphysical pluralism, the thesis that there are (or could be) many actual worlds, which appeals to the possibility of alien forms of triangulation. I dispute Nultyâs reading of Davidson on two important points: Davidsonâs attack on the notion of a conceptual scheme is not, as Nulty thinks, directed at pluralism, and his understanding of the notions of objective truth and reality is at odds with the conception needed for Nultyâs argument. I also show that the pluralist argument fails on its own terms as it requires an assimilation of worlds to worldviews. But there is much of value in Nultyâs paper despite these important flaws. When the confusions are cleared up, we are left with an intriguing and novel line of argument for conceptual relativism.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org springerlink.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper is concerned with Davidson's argument that very general properties of the theory of interpretation make the skeptical claim that most of our beliefs could turn out to be false insupportable. Conceived as a 'straight' answer to the skeptic Davidson's argument is not especially convincing. In particular, Davidson's answer to the skeptic presupposes a framework that allows for a new and seemingly more radical skepticism according to which we might not even have beliefs at all. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Davidson's account of content remaps the conceptual terrain in a fashion that absolves us of the need to rule out the scenarios the skeptic describes. The paper will both present the problems Davidson's position has as a 'straight' solution to skepticism, and discuss the way in which his externalism does weaken the strength of the skeptical challenge.
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| | Scholar | More options ... According to Donald Davidson, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is the third dogma of empiricism. In this paper I examine the ways in which this claim may be interpreted. I conclude by arguing that there remains an innocent version of the scheme-content distinction which is not motivated by empiricism and does not commit us to the pernicious type of dualism that Davidson rejects.
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| | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Richard Rorty has argued that Donald Davidson can be classified as a neopragmatist. To this end, Rorty has tried to show that Davidson's views share important similarities with those of Peirce, James, and Dewey. Davidson, for his part, has tended to resist Rorty's attempts to classify his views in this way. Interestingly, the reasons for Rorty's classification and the reasons for Davidson's resistance share a common trait: an appeal to the elimination of the dualism of conceptual scheme and experiential content on the basis of an assumed background of shared beliefs. According to Rorty, Davidson's background of shared beliefs is closely related to the notion of funded experience found in those thinkers often ..
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid'' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: springerlink.com kluweronline.com ingentaconnect.com jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: springerlink.com kluweronline.com ingentaconnect.com jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on conceptual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but a way of thinking about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... My concern in this paper is with a simple question: Does Donald Davidson's case for an anti-foundationalist epistemology cohere well with his stance on conceptual schemes? After rehearsing Davidson's central anti-foundationalist argument in Section 2, I consider the objection that his argument rests on a premise which is defensible only if we invoke the so-called "dualism of scheme and content", Davidson's opposition to which is the subject of Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I explain why, despite appearances to the contrary, there is actually no incompatibility between the premise of Davidson's anti-foundationalist argument and his insistence that the scheme / content dualism is untenable. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss what this reveals about the basic unity and orientation of Davidson's theory of knowledge.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The claim that there are incommensurable conceptual schemes through which different cultures see the world (or see their worlds) poses a challenge to the viability of comparative philosophy that cannot be easily dismissed. Donald Davidson’s famous attack on the very idea of alternative conceptual schemes through his rejection of the “third dogma of empiricism,” the dogma of the absolute distinction between scheme and content, has never been very well understood. I will argue that the rejection of the dogma enables Davidson to adopt a realist position (as opposed to the anti-realist position of Rorty, who endorses the rejection)and forms the basis for his theory of radical interpretation, supported by his “principle of charity.” And I will use John Dewey’s “postulate of immediate empiricism” to explain Davidson’s views. Together they provide a way to meet the challenge of conceptual relativism.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This essay is a reconstruction and defense of Davidson's argument against the intelligibility of the notion of conceptual scheme. After presenting a brief clarification of Davidson's argument in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', I turn to reconstructing Davidson's argument. Unlike many commentators, and occasionally Davidson, who hold that the motive force of the argument is the Principle of Charity (or the denial of the Third Dogma), I argue that there is a further principle which underlies the argument. This principle I call the Strong Discrimination Principle. But the argument of the paper is not purely exegetical. Not only do I show how the Strong Discrimination Principle meets certain objections to Davidson's argument, but I show how the Principle clarifies the realist position. In particular, I show how a line of argument advanced by Rorty and Putnam against (metaphysical) realism can be rejected.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Jack S. Crumley, Talking lions and lion talk: Davidson on conceptual schemes
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