Many worlds, the cluster-state quantum computer, and the problem of the preferred basis

Abstract
I argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum computation is not licensed by, and in fact is conceptually inferior to, the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics from which it is derived. I argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum computation is incompatible with the recently developed cluster state model of quantum computation. Based on these considerations I conclude that we should reject the many worlds explanation of quantum computation.
Keywords Quantum computation  Quantum mechanics  Many worlds  Everettian interpretation  quantum parallelism  quantum speed-up  cluster state  measurement based  one way  preferred basis problem
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,095
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jeremy Butterfield (2001). Some Worlds of Quantum Theory. In R. J. Russell, N. Murphy & C. J. Isham (eds.), Quantum Physics and Divine Action. Vatican Observatory Publications. 111--140.

View all 18 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
David Wallace (2002). Worlds in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 33 (4):637-661.
Meir Hemmo (2007). Quantum Probability and Many Worlds. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):333-350.
A. M. Steane (2003). A Quantum Computer Only Needs One Universe. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (3):469-478.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-01-11

Total downloads

49 ( #36,399 of 1,102,060 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #68,255 of 1,102,060 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.