David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):117 – 132 (2006)
What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral epistemology. On this view, the empirical study of moral judgement does have important implications for moral philosophy. But moral philosophy also has important implications for the empirical study of moral judgement.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (1971/2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Regina A. Rini (2013). Making Psychology Normatively Significant. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):257-274.
David Morrow (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.
Similar books and articles
Joshua May, Empirical Work in Moral Psychology. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
Susan Dwyer (2009). Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological Implications for the Study of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
Karen Jones (2006). Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Michael J. Pardales (2002). "So, How Did You Arrive at That Decision?" Connecting Moral Imagination and Moral Judgement. Journal of Moral Education 31 (4):423-437.
Maria Elton (2008). Moral Sense and Natural Reason. Review of Metaphysics 62 (1):79-110.
Shaun Nichols (2004). After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.
Benedict Smith (2010). Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons. Palgrave Macmillan.
Katinka Quintelier & Daniel Fessler (2012). Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative Relativism. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):95-113.
Garrett Cullity (1999). Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #132,874 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?