Moral perception

European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175 (2010)
Abstract: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non-moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non-moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately addressed. The first objection is that the moral perception view has implausible commitments concerning the morally blind, people who would claim not to perceive wrongness. The second objection is that the moral perception view is not really compatible with a wide range of the main candidate moral theories. I argue that the moral empiricist has plausible responses to both of these objections. I then address three residual concerns that my defense raises
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00343.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2003). Reductive Theories of Modality. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 180-208.
Kris McDaniel (2009). Structure-Making. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):251-274.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Robert Cowan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
David Faraci (2015). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
Michael Rubin (2015). Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):386-410.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

148 ( #15,475 of 1,727,286 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

14 ( #49,256 of 1,727,286 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.