David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:169 - 209 (2002)
[Garrett Cullity] Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a framework for understanding the relationships between practical reasons. A central part of this framework is the idea that there is an important kind of reason-a 'presumptive reason'-which need not be conclusive, but which is neither pro tanto nor prima facie. /// [Richard Holton] Should particularists about ethics claim that moral principles are never true? Or should they rather claim that any finite set of principles will not be sufficient to capture ethics? This paper explores and defends the possibility of embracing the second of these claims whilst rejecting the first, a position termed 'principled particularism'. The main argument that particularists present for their position-the argument that holds that any moral conclusion can be superseded by further considerations-is quite compatible with principled particularism; indeed, it is compatible with the idea that every true moral conclusion can be shown to follow deductively from a finite set of premises. Whilst it is true that these premises must contain implicit ceteris paribus clauses, this does not render the arguments trivial. On the contrary, they can do important work in justifying moral conclusions. Finally the approach is briefly applied to the related field of jurisprudence.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard Holton (2002). Principles and Particularisms. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1):191-209.
Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
Simon Kirchin (2007). Moral Particularism: An Introduction. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):8-15.
Pekka Väyrynen (2006). Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation. Ethics 116 (4):707-741.
Philipp Schwind (2006). A Critical Discussion of Jonathan Dancy's Moral Particularism. Dissertation, St. Andrews
Michael Ridge (2005). What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism? Ratio 18 (1):93-103.
Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge (2005). What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism? Ratio 18 (1):93–103.
Michael Ridge (2005). The Many Moral Particularisms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83 - 106.
Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (2011). Defending Particularism From Supervenience/Resultance Attack. Acta Analytica 26 (4):387-402.
Brad Hooker (2008). Moral Particularism and the Real World. In Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge. 12--30.
Vojko Strahovnik (2007). Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW] Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (21):512-518.
Roger Crisp (2007). Ethics Without Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
Garrett Cullity (2002). Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):169–190.
Andrew Jordan (2013). Reasons, Holism And Virtue Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):248-268.
Shidan Lotfi (2009). Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and Moral Particularism. Theoria 75 (2):100-116.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads19 ( #83,525 of 1,096,362 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #58,557 of 1,096,362 )
How can I increase my downloads?