Online research in philosophy

Open-mindedness enjoys widespread recognition as an intellectual virtue. This is evident, among other ways, in its appearance on nearly every list of intellectual virtues in the virtue epistemology literature.1 Despite its popularity, however, it is far from clear what exactly open-mindedness amounts to: that is, what sort of intellectual orientation or activity is essential to it. In fact, there are ways of thinking about open-mindedness that cast serious doubt on its status as an intellectual virtue. Consider the following description, from Robert Roberts and Jay Wood (2007), of a ‘bright college freshman, taking an introductory course in philosophy.’ Given this student’s ‘taste for ideas,’ she ..

The method of analytic tableaux is employed in many introductory texts and has also been used quite extensively as a basis for automated theorem proving. In this paper, we discuss the complexity of the system as a method for refuting contradictory sets of clauses, and resolve several open questions. We discuss the three forms of analytic tableaux: clausal tableaux, generalized clausal tableaux, and binary tableaux. We resolve the relative complexity of these three forms of tableaux proofs and also resolve the relative complexity of analytic tableaux versus resolution. We show that there is a quasi-polynomial simulation of tree resolution by analytic tableaux; this simulation is close to optimal, since we give a matching lower bound that is tight to within a polynomial.

The primary goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the notion that the rejection of an individualist or internalist approach to reference1 entails a weak sufficient condition for singular thought—for example, that hearing someone use the name ‘Feynman’ is sufficient to enable one to entertain a singular thought about Feynman, regardless how little one knows about Feynman. This notion is espoused, implicitly or explicitly, by at least Bach (1987, 2004), Boer and Lycan (1986), Devitt (1981, 2001), Jeshion (2002), Rozemond (1993), Salmon (1989, 2004), Soames (1989, 2002), Thau (2002), and Wettstein (1986, 2003). I will call the notion ‘Millian externalism’ (though there clearly are, otherwise, significant differences amongst this list of proponents). A striking recent example is Salmon’s (2004: 254) claim that “looking at a new class-enrolment list” suffices to enable singular thoughts about previously unfamiliar enrollees. In §1, I situate Millian externalism within its historical and conceptual context. In §§ 2-3, I investigate some arguments for and against Millian externalism, and discuss some related general theoretical questions.

Why are the efforts at coordination so feeble? Unless we face this question, we may never see progress. The answer is not hard to find. Decisions on matters of life and death are awesome; decisions on some awesome questions are guided by accepted laws, rules or customs; other awesome questions are open. Obviously, having to decide on an open, awesome question is a hardship in every possible manner: intellectually and practically, legally and morally, socially and psychologically. People are reluctant to explore predicaments if all available alternative remedies to them implicate decisions on open, awesome questions.

We present a list of open questions in reverse mathematics, including some relevant background information for each question. We also mention some of the areas of reverse mathematics that are starting to be developed and where interesting open question may be found.

Why do we ask questions? Because we want to have some information. But why this particular kind of information? Because only information of this particular kind is helpful to resolve the decision problem that the agent faces. In this paper I argue that questions are asked because their answers help to resolve the questioner's decision problem, and that this assumption helps us to interpret interrogative sentences. Interrogative sentences are claimed to have a semantically underspecified meaning and this underspecification is resolved by means of the decision problem.

Kripke, in "Naming and Necessity", defended answers to two kinds of questions about names and reference: a Millian semantics that answers a question of descriptive semantics and a causal account of reference that answers a metasemantic question--a question about what makes a descriptive semantic theory correct. It is argued that the main philosophical work in Kripke's defense of his account of names and reference is done by distinguishing the questions of clarifying the alternative possible answers to them in a way that provides a rebuttal to philosophical arguments that a Millian semantics is impossible.

In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.

Abstract. This research is of a qualitative nature, employing fourteen open unstructured interviews. Participants were comprised of undergraduate students and non-academics currently symbiosing with domesticated cats and dogs. The research question is “Do animals help resolve existential questions?” The research uses the existential writings of Jean-Paul Sartre as a foundation. The analysis employs the systematic discourse analysis techniques formulated by Potter & Mulkay (1985), and Potter & Wetherell (1989). The discussion focuses on the linguistic construction of Sartre's concepts of being, and the positioning role of language as used in interpersonal relationships. The findings from this research indicate that other animals do play an important role in aiding us to resolve existential questions, but we give them little in terms of reciprocal payment for these services. Therefore, should we be employing other animals in our search for answers to our own personal existential questions at all? As this is an existentialist piece of research, and also coming from a social constructionist viewpoint, there is an undercurrent of consciousness raising flowing throughout it.

Millianism is the familiar view that some expressions, such as proper names, contribute only their referent to the semantic content of sentences in which they occur. Inan (Philosophical Studies 2010) has recently argued that the Millian is committed to the following odd conclusion: There may be questions that he is able to grasp but that he cannot answer, either affirmatively, negatively, or with a simple I don’t know . The Millian is indeed committed to this conclusion. But we intend to show that Inan’s argument generalizes, so that everyone who accepts certain largely uncontroversial principles is committed to the odd conclusion that there may be questions that are graspable but not answerable.