David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2):143-159 (2003)
A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that speciﬁc cognitive capacities be (a) heritable and (b) ‘quasi-independent’ from other heritable traits. They must be heritable because there can be no selection for traits that are not. They must be quasi-independent from other heritable traits, since adaptive variations in a speciﬁc cognitive capacity could have no distinctive consequences for ﬁtness if eﬀecting those variations required widespread changes in other unrelated traits and capacities as well. These requirements would be satisﬁed by innate cognitive modules, as the dominant paradigm in evolutionary cognitive psychology assumes. However, those requirements would also be satisﬁed by heritable learning biases, perhaps in the form of architec- tural or chronotopic constraints, that operated to increase the canalization of speciﬁc cognitive capacities in the ancestral environment (Cummins and Cummins 1999). As an organism develops, cognitive capacities that are highly canalized as the result of heritable learning biases might result in an organism that is behaviourally quite similar to an organism whose innate modules come on line as the result of various environ- mental triggers. Taking this possibility seriously is increasingly important as the case against innate cognitive modules becomes increasingly strong.
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