Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content

Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):103-127 (1992)
Abstract
I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of representation must take. I hope, however, to have created some advance sympathy for the gesture by distinguishing the problem of representation from the problem of targets on the one hand, and from the problem truth-conditions for the attitudes on the other
Keywords Content  Logic  Mental States  Semantics  Theory
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Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
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