David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360 (1979)
In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then determine an infinity of conventional meanings from a finite number of meaning-Conventions
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
S. Gaukroger (1998). Justification, Truth, and the Development of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):97-112.
Similar books and articles
Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Radical and Moderate Pragmatics: Does Meaning Determine Truth Conditions? In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press
Mark Risjord (1996). Meaning, Belief, and Language Acquisition. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):465-475.
D. E. Over (1981). Game Theoretical Semantics and Entailment. Studia Logica 40 (1):67 - 74.
Alex Barber (2003). Truth Conditions and Their Recognition. In Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press
Lionel Shapiro (2008). Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
Gary Kemp (2002). Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
Heather Dyke (2003). Tensed Meaning: A Tenseless Account. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:65-81.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #135,870 of 1,700,378 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #88,892 of 1,700,378 )
How can I increase my downloads?