Intention, meaning and truth-conditions

Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360 (1979)
In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then determine an infinity of conventional meanings from a finite number of meaning-Conventions.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00368050
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S. Gaukroger (1998). Justification, Truth, and the Development of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):97-112.

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