Graduate studies at Western
Metaphilosophy 42 (4):360-367 (2011)
|Abstract||Abstract: In her recent book Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Christine Korsgaard does a wonderful job developing her Kantian account of normativity and the rational necessity of morality. Korsgaard's account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. In this discussion, the focus is on the resulting moral theory and, in particular, on Korsgaard's reason for rejecting consequentialist moral theories. The article suggests that we assume that Korsgaard's vindication of Kantian rationalism is successful and ask whether, nonetheless, her account is consistent with consequentialism. It suggests further that we grant that moral reasons are not based on substantive principles, and that they must instead emerge from the purely formal principles of practical reason. Can consequentialist principles nonetheless emerge from the formal constraints of practical reason? Why can't a consequentialist embrace Korsgaard's account of self-constitution and normativity?|
|Keywords||Kantian ethics self‐constitution consequentialism integrity rationalism Korsgaard|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Cholbi (1999). Egoism and the Publicity of Reason: A Reply to Korsgaard. Social Theory and Practice 25 (3):491-517.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Joshua Gert (2002). Korsgaard's Private-Reasons Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):303-324.
Christine M. Korsgaard (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Paul Russell (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. In Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.), “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. Felix Meiner Verlag.
Christine M. Korsgaard, Interview with Korsgaard: Internalism and the Sources of Normativity (Corrected Version).
Michael Smith (1999). Search for the Source. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384–394.
Christine M. Korsgaard (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University Press.
Camillia Kong (2012). The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):661-690.
P. Fristedt (2011). Normativity and Interpretation: Korsgaard's Deontology and the Hermeneutic Conception of the Subject. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (5):533-550.
Bryan Lueck (2009). Kant's Fact of Reason as Source of Normativity. Inquiry 52 (6):596 – 608.
Ariela Tubert (2011). Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):343-362.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1997). The Normativity of Instrumental Reason. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
William F. Bristow (2006). Self-Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal Freedom. Inquiry 49 (6):498 – 523.
Added to index2011-07-05
Total downloads52 ( #23,812 of 739,356 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,356 )
How can I increase my downloads?