Programs in the explanation of behavior

Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87 (1977)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are "internally represented," this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched in information processing terms may have an explanatory interest for a given range of behavior which is independent of physiological explanations of the same range of behavior
Keywords Behavior  Computer  Explanation  Physiology  Program  Science
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Citations of this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computing Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.

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