Online research in philosophy

Reid's theory of perception has long been cited as a paradigmatic example of direct realism; and the term “direct” undoubtedly carries the connotation that external objects are items in “the manifold of intuition.” There are important ways in which perception, on Reid's analysis, undoubtedly is immediate and direct. Nonetheless, this paper contends that, with the exception of his account of our perception of visible fi gure, Reid's theory is not an example of direct realism, if a condition of a theory of percep- tion's being a direct realist theory is that it hold that perception yields acquaintance with external objects, so that those objects are present to consciousness. The defense given in Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology of the no-acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory occurred in the context of a comprehensive account of Reid's theory of perception, and was accordingly brief. This essay places that interpretation in the center of attention so as to offer a more adequate defense, developing somewhat more fully the arguments briefly presented in the book, and adding some additional considerations.

Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and as direct as original perception. Perception is grounded in a productive and developing relationship between the mind and world.

In this paper I develop and defend the thesis that there is a problem with Reid’s direct realism. I also think there is a solution to Reid’s problem, and that, in one passage, Reid has the solution in mind, though he never develops it in detail. But developing and defending Reid’s solution to the problem is the task of a second paper. The task of this paper is to show that Reid is committed to the direct realist thesis (DRT) mind-independent bodily qualities are among the immediate objects of perception; and that this thesis proves incompatible with Reid's sign theory of sensations (STS) sensations function as natural signs of bodily qualities in perception. My thesis bears argument due to the persistence of a dispute among Reid’s readers as to whether he endorsed the DRT, and if so whether it is indeed at odds with the STS. Some argue that Reid endorsed both theses, but that they are not at odds; others argue that the theses are at odds but that Reid did not endorse both; and, most recently, some have argued that Reid rejects the DRT, but not because it conflicts with the STS. My claim that he endorsed both theses and that they are at odds is itself at odds with each of these interpretive camps.

There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to another paper.

For Reid, sensations do not enter into the analysis of perception proper. Instead they “intervene” between the effects of bodily qualities on our sense organs and our perception of those qualities (Inq VI xxi, 174).1 The question addressed in this essay is: What sort of thing does Reid take this interloper to be?2 The answer defended is that sensations are reflexive mental acts, i.e., acts which take themselves as objects.

According to Reid, “the external senses have a double province; to make us feel and to make us perceive.”1 This essay is about the relation of the feeling and the perceiving. The central question is, What does Reid think feelings, or sensations, are doing in the process of perception? Reid’s answer is well-known: sensations function in perception as natural signs of perceived qualities. The answer, however, is not as well-explained, either by Reid or the secondary literature. Reid’s own comments on the sign theory are occasional and their interrelations are neither obvious nor clarified. The literature on the sign theory has yet to recognize and analyze the significance of a cluster of Reid’s distinctions—between original and acquired perception, general and particular principles of our constitution, and relative and absolute conceptions.2 This paper aims to put these pieces together into a systematic interpretation of the sign theory which reveals its overall rationale, structure, and coherence.

For Reid, the external senses have a “double province.” They give rise to both sensation and perception. This essay is about the relation of sensation and perception, a relation Reid’s sign theory of sensations describes. Drawing on Reid’s distinctions between general and particular principles of our constitution, relative and absolute conceptions, and original and acquired perception, the paper systematizes Reid’s sporadic comments on the sign theory. The aim is to offer an interpretation which reveals the overall structure, rationale and coherence of Reid’s sign theory.