Representation and indication
In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier (2004)
|Abstract||This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds|
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