British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):21-40 (1992)
|Abstract||Pure causal theories of reference cannot account for cases of theoretical term reference failure and do not capture the scientific point of introducing new theoretical terminology. In order to account for paradigm cases of reference failure and the point of new theoretical terminology, a descriptive element must play a role in fixing the reference of theoretical terms. Richard Boyd's concept of theory constituitive metaphors provides the necessary descriptive element in reference fixing. In addition to providing a plausible account of reference failure and success, a metaphor approach to reference fixing provides the basis for a plausible realist account of the progress of science. Indeed, the metaphor approach undermines the sceptical force of the meta-induction and Laudan's objections to scientific realism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Epstein (2008). The Realpolitik of Reference. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):1–20.
Howard Sankey (1997). Incommensurability: The Current State of Play. Theoria 12 (3):425-445.
Howard Sankey (1997). Incommensurability: The Current State of Play. Theoria 12 (3):425-45.
Michael Strevens (2012). Theoretical Terms Without Analytic Truths. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):167-190.
Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
Christina McLeish (2006). Realism Bit by Bit: Part II. Disjunctive Partial Reference. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):171--190.
Robert Nola (1980). Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms. Philosophy of Science 47 (4):505-531.
Friedel Weinert (1991). Introducing Events, Successful Reference and Reference-Fixing. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (1):155-167.
Ilkka Niiniluoto (1997). Reference Invariance and Truthlikeness. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):546-554.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #21,132 of 549,071 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,333 of 549,071 )
How can I increase my downloads?