Theoria 16 (2):237-268 (2001)
|Abstract||In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s (1981) criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So it is that the self-refuting nature of these positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My conclusion relates Putnam’s dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions, ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jürgen Dümont (1999). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (2):341-364.
Damian Cox (2003). Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds. Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46.
D. C. Smith (2003). What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intentionality? Philosophical Papers 32 (1):83-96.
Hilary Putnam (1982). Beyond the Fact--Value Dichotomy. Crítica 14 (41):3--12.
Christopher Norris (2002). Hilary Putnam: Realism, Reason, and the Uses of Uncertainty. Distributed in the U.S. By Palgrave.
Hilary Putnam (1994). Comments and Replies. In Peter Clark & Bob Hale (eds.), Reading Putnam. Blackwell.
Louise Cummings (2002). Hilary Putnam's Dialectical Thinking: An Application to Fallacy Theory. Argumentation 16 (2):197-229.
H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #232,382 of 549,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?