David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophy 94 (10):535-542 (1997)
The thesis of this paper is that the causal theory of mental content (hereafter CT) is incompatible with an elementary fact of perceptual psychology, namely, that the detection of distal properties generally requires the mediation of a “theory.” I shall call this fact the nontransducibility of distal properties (hereafter NTDP). The argument proceeds in two stages. The burden of stage one is that, taken together, CT and the language of thought hypothesis (hereafter LOT) are incompatible with NTDP. The burden of stage two is that acceptance of CT requires acceptance of LOT as well. It follows that CT is incompatible with NTDP. I organize things in this way in part because it makes the argument easier to understand, and in part because the stage-two thesis—that CT entails LOT—has some independent interest and is therefore worth separating from the rest of the argument.
|Keywords||Causation Content Epistemology Mental Model Semantics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1994). The Supervenience of Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.
Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
David M. Braun (1991). Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (December):375-89.
William E. Seager (1993). Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections. Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77.
Anthony Newman (2006). The Burning Barn Fallacy in Defenses of Externalism About Mental Content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.
Bradley Rives (2009). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):525 – 529.
Jeff Speaks (2006). Is Mental Content Prior to Linguistic Meaning?: Stalnaker on Intentionality. Noûs 40 (3):428-467.
Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining Terms In The Language of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.
Tim Crane (1992). Mental Causation and Mental Reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (425):185-202.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #27,446 of 1,413,271 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #42,184 of 1,413,271 )
How can I increase my downloads?