David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 117 (4):525-554 (2008)
Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like ‘think’, are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names, being variables, refer rigidly in the latter merely intensional contexts, but may vary their reference in hyperintensional contexts. This conforms to the intuition that the content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates referential uncertainty. Furthermore, names in hyperintensional contexts are ambiguous between de re* and de dicto* interpretations. This fact is used to account for asymmetric mistaken identity attributions (for example, Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline, but he doesn’t think Rosaline is Katherine). The variable theory compares favourably with its alternatives, including Millianism and descriptivism. Millians cannot account for the behaviour of names in hyperintensional contexts, while descriptivists cannot generate a necessary contrast between intensional and hyperintensional contexts. No other theory can capture the facts pertaining to the existentially bound use of names.
|Keywords||hyperintensionality concealed questions proper names attitude reports|
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Brian Rabern (2013). Monsters in Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
Brian Rabern (2012). Against the Identification of Assertoric Content with Compositional Value. Synthese 189 (1):75-96.
Paolo Santorio (2013). Descriptions as Variables. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):41-59.
Dolf Rami (2014). The Use-Conditional Indexical Conception of Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):119-150.
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