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Agency and consciousness

Synthese 120 (2):271-294 (1999)
Abstract In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one'€™s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle'€™s view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility
Keywords Action  Agency  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Searle, J
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