Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486 (2002)
|Abstract||The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics. In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
Stathis Psillos (2013). Semirealism or Neo-Aristotelianism? Erkenntnis 78 (1):29 - 38.
William J. FitzPatrick (2004). Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism. Mind 113 (450):285-318.
Daan Evers (2013). In Defence of Proportionalism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2).
Michelle Mason (2005). Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason. Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.
Steven Daskal (2010). Absolute Value as Belief. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):221 - 229.
Yonatan Shemmer (2004). Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):265-294.
Cei Maslen (2002). A Defense of Humeanism From Nagel's Persimmon. Erkenntnis 57 (1):41-46.
Jonathan Dancy (1995). Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:1-18.
Donald C. Hubin (1999). What's Special About Humeanism. Noûs 33 (1):30-45.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #68,300 of 739,344 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,344 )
How can I increase my downloads?