Systematic Divergences in Malebranche and Cudworth

Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (3):343-363 (2003)
: For Cudworth, God would be a drudge if He did each and every thing, and so the universe contains plastic natures. Malebranche argues that finite power is unintelligible and thus that God does do each and every thing. The supremacy of God is reflected in the range of His activity and also in the manner of His activity: He acts by general non-composite volitions. Malebranche (like Cudworth) is careful to adjust other aspects of his system to square with his position on causality, but his view that we are free and accountable for what we do will not be revised
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2003.0026
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References found in this work BETA
Gary C. Hatfield (1979). Force (God) in Descartes' Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (2):113-140.

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Citations of this work BETA
Vili Lähteenmäki (2010). Cudworth on Types of Consciousness. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):9-34.
Patrick J. Connolly (2015). Locke and the Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2551-2564.

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