Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460 (1997)
|Abstract||Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move|
|Keywords||Emotion Evolution Fear Intentionality Metaphysics|
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