Graduate studies at Western
Ratio 4 (1):16-24 (1991)
|Abstract||In Reasons and Persons Parfit vacillates between two views of personal identity. Both views have unpalatable consequences. According to one view, the question, "Is person A the same as person C?" is always empty. According to the other view, this question is empty only some of the time. The first view is elegant, but it has consequences which are counterintuitive and incompatible with Parfit's later claims. The second view is commonsensical, but its only coherent version is vulnerable to an argument made by Parfit, himself|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Personal Identity Reductionism Parfit, D|
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